We Didn\u27t Start the Fire…Did We?  Analyzing Why California Cannot Seem to Extinguish Its Worsening Wildfire Problem by Melo, Rizzlyn Terri M.
Volume 31 Issue 1 Article 5 
1-27-2020 
We Didn't Start the Fire…Did We? Analyzing Why California Cannot 
Seem to Extinguish Its Worsening Wildfire Problem 
Rizzlyn Terri M. Melo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rizzlyn T. Melo, We Didn't Start the Fire…Did We? Analyzing Why California Cannot Seem to Extinguish Its 
Worsening Wildfire Problem, 31 Vill. Envtl. L.J. (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol31/iss1/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2019]
WE DIDN’T START THE FIRE . . . DID WE? ANALYZING WHY
CALIFORNIA CANNOT SEEM TO EXTINGUISH ITS
WORSENING WILDFIRE PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
An old California legend tells the story of how a lumber mill
crew in the 1850s looked out over tall evergreens on a summer day
and declared, “this is paradise.”1  As fate would have it, the area of
land that enthralled the crew with its beauty would later be named
Paradise.2  Whether this legend accurately depicts the origin of Par-
adise’s name is debatable, but for approximately twenty-seven thou-
sand people, this town was once paradise, or at the very least,
home.3  Paradise’s website promises scenic nature, recreational ac-
tivities, and most of all, “an engaging environment.”4  Any visitor
now though would be quick to see that the residents have all evacu-
ated – their homes and businesses reduced to ashes.5  Paradise is
just one of the many casualties of the California wildfires.6
The wildfires ravaged both northern and southern parts of Cal-
ifornia, leaving the state and its citizens struggling in the after-
math.7  The fires claimed lives and decimated communities and
environments.8  As a result, Californians are keen on ensuring ca-
lamities do not escalate to this magnitude again.9  While naturally
1. Associated Press, Remembering Paradise, A Town Wiped Out by the Northern Cal-
ifornia Wildfire, STAR ADVERTISER (Nov. 16, 2018, 10:42 AM), https://www.starad
vertiser.com/2018/11/16/breaking-news/remembering-paradise-a-town-wiped-
out-by-the-northern-california-wildfire/ (describing legend presumed to be origin
of Paradise’s name).
2. Id. (implying lumber mill crew foreshadowed town being named Paradise).
3. About Paradise, TOWN OF PARADISE CAL., https://www.townofparadise.com/
index.php/visitors/about-paradise (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (estimating popula-
tion of Paradise).
4. Id. (describing Paradise).
5. Steven Kiggins, Alyana Shulman, David Benda, Mike Chapman, & Caroline
Simon, ‘Destroyed’: In Paradise, California, Entire Community of 27,000 Was Ordered to
Evacuate, USA TODAY (Nov. 9, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2018/11/09/camp-fire-paradise-california-destroyed-evacuations/
1940450002/ (describing destruction of Paradise’s community).
6. Id. (detailing how wildfires destroyed Paradise).
7. Id. (describing fire dangers all over California).
8. Id. (discussing wildfire’s impact).
9. See Madeleine Ayer & Scott Glover, California’s Largest Utility Provider’s Role
in Wildfires is Under Scrutiny, CNN (Dec. 19, 2018, 8:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
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occurring wildfires do arise, many environmentalists believe there is
nothing “natural” about these disasters, attributing human activity
as the source igniting these flames.10  With this in mind, Califor-
nia’s largest utility provider, Pacific Gas and Electric (“PG&E”), is
facing immense scrutiny for its involvement in past fires.11  In 2017
alone, the electric company caused sixteen fires.12  In light of these
findings, Californians affected by the wildfires are pressuring politi-
cal figures to hold PG&E accountable instead of protecting it from
liability.13
This Comment explores the factors intensifying California’s
wildfire crisis and how the state seeks to remedy those mistakes.14
Part II describes California’s history with wildfires, including the
damage caused by the record-breaking fires of 2017 and 2018.15
The discussion in Part III focuses on PG&E and its role in the re-
cent wildfires.16  Part IV provides an overview of California’s wild-
fire regulation and how different political figures have impacted
legislation.17  Finally, Part V expounds on how climate change,
PG&E, and California have contributed to the severity of the wild-
fires and why this crisis demands change.18
10. Umair Irfan, California’s Wildfires Are Hardly “Natural” –Humans Made Them
Worse at Every Step, VOX (Nov. 19, 2018, 8:14 AM),  https://www.vox.com/2018/8/
7/17661096/california-wildfires-2018-camp-woolsey-climate-change (asserting
humans ignite eighty-four percent of wildfires).
11. Ayer & Glover, supra note 9 (discussing critics’ feelings towards PG&E in
connection with California wildfires).
12. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of Four Wildfires in Butte and Nevada
Counties, CAL FIRE (May 25, 2018), http://files.constantcontact.com/
fac05d5d601/84b67f87-60c5-489b-ac2c-bc1c33dfd067.pdf (determining PG&E
caused four fires in 2017); CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Causes of Twelve Wildfires
in Mendocino, Humboldt, Butte, Sonoma, Lake, and Napa Counties, CAL FIRE (June 8,
2018), https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5100/2017_wildfiresiege_cause.pdf (deter-
mining PG&E caused twelve 2017 wildfires).
13. Jonathan J. Cooper, New California Law Helps Utilities with Wildfire Lawsuits,
U.S. NEWS (Sept. 21, 2018, 4:33 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/
california/articles/2018-09-21/new-california-law-helps-utilities-with-wildfire-law-
suits (discussing Governor Brown’s decision to sign Senate Bill 901 into law).
14. For a discussion of what factors affected California’s wildfire crisis, see
infra notes 222-236 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of California’s history with wildfires, see infra notes 19-69
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of what actions PG&E has taken to start and prolong
wildfires, see infra notes 70-142 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of California’s policy on wildfire regulations, see infra
notes 143-202 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of accountability for the wildfires, see infra notes 203-242
and accompanying text.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF WILDFIRES IN CALIFORNIA
Fuel, oxygen, and a heat source – known as the fire triangle
among firefighters – combine to ignite and sustain wildfires.19  Cali-
fornia has an abundance of “trees, grasses, brush, and even homes,”
which are, essentially, kindling for wildfires.20  The state also has
dry weather and droughts, which make vegetation even more
flammable.21
Despite the media coverage of the 2017 and 2018 wildfires, the
occasional forest fire in California is not a new phenomenon.22
Wildfires occur naturally and can play an important role in ecosys-
tems, enriching soil by “burning dead or decaying matter . . . [and]
removing disease-ridden vegetation and harmful insects.”23  In ad-
dition, these wildfires help sunlight reach plants on the forest floor
by removing dense canopies and undergrowth.24  Unlike these nat-
urally-occurring wildfires, the human-propagated ones to which
California has grown accustomed are more catastrophic than
beneficial.25
A. The “New Normal”: How Rising Temperatures Lead to More
Fires
While California has always been a hotbed for wildfires, it has
never experienced them at the frequency and intensity of the past
few years.26  According to the California Department of Forestry
and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), the entity investigating the wild-
fires, fifteen of the twenty largest fires in California occurred within
19. Claire Wolters, Wildfires, Explained, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://
www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/natural-disasters/wildfires/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 19, 2019) (explaining conditions necessary for wildfire to form).
20. Id. (listing what materials could provide fuel for wildfires).
21. Id. (discussing how weather conditions in California help exacerbate wild-
fire formation).
22. See Irfan, supra note 10 (explaining occurrence of naturally caused wild-
fires in nature).
23. Wolters, supra note 19 (discussing naturally occurring wildfires’ integral
role in environment).
24. Id. (describing benefit of naturally-occurring wildfire).
25. See Irfan, supra note 10 (characterizing increase in wildfires as growing
trend).
26. Jeremy Berke & Dana Varinsky, California’s Devasting Wildfires Are Part of an
Alarming Trend – Here’s Why They’ve Gotten So Much Worse, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 9,
2018, 6:43 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ventura-county-la-fires-califor-
nia-worsening-trend-2017-12 (comparing frequency of wildfires before 2000 to
now).
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the past twenty years.27  Wildfires are striking more often, and “the
average wildfire season now lasts at least [two-and-a-half] months
longer than it did in the early 1970s.”28  As a result, wildfires are no
longer limited to burning only between mid-summer and early au-
tumn, which Californians used to recognize as wildfire season.29
These facts show how wildfires have become an ongoing concern
rather than a seasonal risk.30  Former California Governor Jerry
Brown best described California’s worsening wildfire conditions
when he famously referred to them as “a new normal.”31
Climate change is causing wildfires to become noticeably more
commonplace.32  Higher temperatures during the spring and sum-
mer seasons and premature snowmelt lead to dry soil and periods
of drought.33  Drier conditions are particularly dangerous in for-
ests, where branches and plants act as fuel for fires.34  While these
factors - drier conditions, drought, and excess vegetation - are more
than sufficient to make a fire lethal, Santa Ana winds further exac-
erbate a wildfire’s intensity.35  Santa Ana winds refer to winds that
27. Top Twenty Largest California Wildfires, CAL FIRE, https://www.fire.ca.gov/
media/5510/top20_acres.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (listing largest California
wildfires by acres burned with 2018 wildfire listed as number one).
28. Berke & Varinsky, supra note 26 (explaining how climate change is to
blame for increase in wildfires).
29. Erik Ortiz, There’s No More Typical California Wildfire Season. It May Be Year-
round, Experts Warn, NBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/us-news/there-s-no-more-typical-wildfire-season-california-it-may-
n934521 (crediting climate change as reason for frequency of wildfires occurring
out of season).
30. Berke & Varinsky, supra note 26 (describing wildfire season as now being
year-round).
31. Jose A. Del Real & Inyoung Kang, California Today: Returning to Redding
After the Carr Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/
06/us/california-today-redding-carr-fire.html (describing Governor Brown’s ad-
dress to Californians on impending wildfires).
32. Is Global Warming Fueling Increased Wildfire Risks?, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS: GLOBAL WARMING (July 24, 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/global-
warming/science-and-impacts/impacts/global-warming-and-wild-
fire.html#.XFTiR6pKgdW (attributing rise in greenhouse gases to increase in fre-
quency and severity of wildfires).
33. Id. (explaining how climate change makes land more susceptible to
wildfires).
34. See A.L. Westerling & B.P. Bryant, Climate Change and Wildfire in California,
U.C. SAN DIEGO (Dec. 12, 2007), http://tenaya.ucsd.edu/tioga/pdffiles/Wester
ling_wildfire_jan2008.pdf (describing flammability of vegetation).
35. Rebecca Worby, What Are the Santa Ana Winds, and Why Are They Such a
Wildfire Hazard?, PAC. STANDARD (Nov. 9, 2018), https://psmag.com/environ-
ment/what-are-the-santa-ana-winds (describing Santa Ana winds’ role in wildfire
formation).
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heat up and lose moisture as they speed down mountain passes.36
Though they typically only blow for a few days, these fast-moving
winds turn small flames into monstrous fires in areas where condi-
tions are already unusually warm and moisture-deprived.37  Scien-
tists predict that if these conditions worsen, the average area
burned could increase by seventy-seven percent.38  Greenhouse
gases are at the root of this problem, as their emissions create a
vicious cycle of warming temperatures and fires.39
B. The 2017 Wildfires
As California saw in 2017, wildfires are no longer limited to a
specific season.40  Despite December usually functioning as the ad-
vent of California’s wet season, the Creek, Rye, and Lilac Fires
burned approximately 25,700 acres in southern California.41  These
fires came shortly after the Tubbs Fire, which devastated northern
California.42  The Tubbs Fire burned parts of Napa, Sonoma, and
Lake Counties, nearly eviscerating the city of Santa Rosa.43
The largest fire of the year was the Thomas Fire, which began
in early December and burned approximately 281,893 acres in Ven-
tura and Santa Barbara Counties.44  Strong Santa Ana winds pre-
36. Id. (describing distinct features of Santa Ana winds, such as lack of
moisture).
37. Id. (describing how dry Santa Ana winds can rapidly turn flames into
larger, deadlier wildfires).
38. Wildfire, CAL.’S FOURTH CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT, http://
www.climateassessment.ca.gov/state/overview/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2019) (predict-
ing worse wildfires if greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise).
39. See Kendra Pierre-Louis & Nadja Popovich, Climate Change is Fueling Wild-
fires Nationwide, New Report Warns, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/27/climate/wildfire-global-warming.html
(explaining how wildfires worsen climate change).
40. See Kevin Byrne, California’s 2017 Wildfire Season to Rank Among Most De-
structive, Costly on Record, ACCUWEATHER (July 3, 2019), https://
www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/californias-2017-wildfire-season-to-rank-
among-most-destructive-costly-on-record/70003704 (discussing how destructive
wildfires occurred outside of season).
41. Id. (describing damage caused by fires in December).
42. Kurtis Alexander, Evan Sernoffsky & Lizzie Johnson, Tubbs Fire: State
Blames Private Electrical Equipment for Deadly Wine Country Blaze, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 24,
2019, 7:26 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/article/Tubbs-
Fire-State-blames-private-electrical-13559073.php (describing Tubbs Fire’s reach).
43. J.D. Morris & Lizzie Johnson, After Long Wait for Tubbs Fire Report, Santa
Rosa Tries to Move Forward, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 27, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://
www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/article/After-long-wait-for-Tubbs-Fire-re-
port-Santa-Rosa-13564530.php (discussing how Tubbs Fire destroyed Santa Rosa
and left thousands of residents homeless).
44. Dakin Andone, The Largest Wildfire in California’s Modern History is Finally
Out, More Than 6 Months After it Started, CNN (June 2, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://
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vented containment, allowing the Thomas Fire to remain active
well into the new year.45  The Thomas Fire became one of the larg-
est ever in California until 2018, which proved wildfires could get
much bigger and deadlier.46
C. The 2018 Wildfires
2018 marked a historic year for wildfires, as numerous wildfires
spread across the state before ending in Butte County.47  The most
prominent fires were the Woolsey and Camp Fires, which began in
November and grew more destructive than the fires preceding
them.48  The Woolsey Fire devastated the Malibu area of southern
California.49  At the same time, the Camp Fire raged through
northern California.50  It claimed eighty-five lives and destroyed
nearly nineteen thousand structures, a majority of which were resi-
dential homes.51  The Camp Fire grew at an unprecedented rate
and reduced the town of Paradise to ashes within a single day.52
www.cnn.com/2018/06/02/us/thomas-fire-officially-out/index.html (characteriz-
ing Thomas Fire as largest wildfire in California’s modern history).
45. Id. (describing arduous process of containing Thomas Fire).
46. For a discussion of the overwhelming damage caused by the 2018 wildfires
in comparison to previous wildfires, see infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
47. See generally Fire Tracker, S.F. CHRON., https://projects.sfchronicle.com/
trackers/california-fire-map/2018-county-fire (last visited July 14, 2019) (listing
2018 California wildfires).
48. See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., The Deadliest, Most Destructive Wildfire in Califor-
nia’s History Has Finally Been Contained, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/25/camp-fire-deadliest-wildfire-cal
ifornias-history-has-been-contained/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4b45a6824f9d
(discussing Camp Fire damage); Matt Stiles & Jon Schleuss, Woolsey Fire Likely Worst
Ever to Hit Malibu, With Home Losses Topping $1.6 Billion, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-malibu-woolsey-destruction-map/ (dis-
cussing when residents first saw flames from Woolsey Fire).
49. Id. (describing effects of Woolsey Fire in Malibu).
50. See Fire Tracker Camp Fire, S.F. CHRON., https://projects.sfchronicle.com/
trackers/california-fire-map/2018-camp-fire (last visited July 14, 2019) (showing lo-
cation of Camp Fire).
51. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of the Camp Fire, CAL FIRE (May 15,
2019), https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5038/campfire_cause.pdf (describing
Camp Fire statistics).
52. James Sergent, Damon Arthur, & Karl Gelles, Paradise Lost; Its Residents
Found, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/
2018/12/24/camp-fire-tracking-where-paradises-residents-have-gone/240608400
2/ (detailing how acres burned by Camp Fire grew more than 350 percent from
first day to second day).
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D. Living in the Aftermath
Though California has contained all the 2017 and 2018 wild-
fires, it still faces a difficult and lengthy road to recovery.53  The
Camp Fire displaced about thirty-five thousand people, adding to
the number of Californians already displaced by previous fires.54
The wildfires thus forced the state, particularly northern California,
into a housing shortage, with many families relying on the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) for temporary hous-
ing.55  Victims will likely rely on FEMA and its resources indefi-
nitely, as it could take time to rebuild all the homes lost to the
fires.56  Furthering their distress, President Donald J. Trump has
threatened this relief, tweeting that he “ordered FEMA to send no
more money.”57  Though the President has not followed through
on his threat, California is not receiving the federal aid it seeks de-
spite congressional negotiations.58  Early in 2018, Congress and the
President failed to reach an agreement on California’s request for
nine billion dollars in wildfire relief.59
In addition to funding for wildfire victims, cleaning the debris
and rebuilding structures will be a costly venture.60  In 2017, the
insurance industry paid a record $11.8 billion to northern Califor-
nia fire victims, while disaster relief officials billed debris removal at
around $1.3 billion for this area alone.61  The insurance payouts of
the 2018 wildfires are expected to be even greater, with state and
53. See Wildfire Victims Thrust into Northern California Housing Shortage, CBS
NEWS (Dec. 26, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-wild-
fire-victims-thrust-into-northern-california-housing-shortage/ (detailing effects of
wildfire on Californians and how repercussions will last years).
54. Id. (discussing housing prospects of displaced individuals).
55. Id. (describing how FEMA provides money to temporarily house displaced
families).
56. See id. (highlighting need for temporary housing).





(claiming to have ceased funding for FEMA).
58. Tal Kopan, California Wildfire Aid Left Out of Congressional Shutdown Deal,
S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 12, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/arti-
cle/California-wildfire-aid-left-out-of-congressional-13610323.php (discussing in-
ability to reach deal on wildfire relief).
59. Id. (stating California request for aid overlooked in negotiations).
60. California Wildfire Costs Soar Past Last Year’s Records, NBC NEWS (Dec. 12,
2018, 2:07 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-wildfires-
costs-soar-past-last-year-s-records-n946856 (predicting cleanup costs for 2018 wild-
fires will exceed 2017).
61. Id. (claiming insurance and cleanup costs were at record-high in 2017).
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federal authorities estimating clean-up costs will exceed three bil-
lion dollars.62
To make matters worse, health experts expect the deteriorat-
ing air quality stemming from the fires to adversely affect Californi-
ans’ health for years to come.63  In the weeks immediately following
the Camp Fire, northern California’s air quality mirrored the condi-
tions of notoriously smoggy and populated countries, such as India
and China.64  While “[r]esearch into the long-term health effects of
large wildfires is still new[,] . . . a growing body of science shows
how inhalation of minuscule particles from wood fires can nestle in
the folds of lung tissue and do harm to the human immune sys-
tem.”65  The health effects have already begun to manifest, with city
officials encouraging evacuees to wear face masks and increasing
amounts of people becoming hospitalized for respiratory issues.66
In the coming years, California could experience a rise in days with
diminished air quality, a prospect that further intensifies the respir-
atory issues Californians are already facing.67  According to Stan-
ford pulmonologist and allergist, Dr. Sharon Chinthrajah,
“California . . . is being reset to a new reality[,]” one where the
human body must adapt to climate change.68  The negative effects
of the wildfires on both humans and the environment highlight the
need for better wildfire prevention.69
62. Id. (discussing expectations for 2018 wildfire costs).
63. Julie Turkewitz & Matt Richtel, Air Quality in California: Devastating Fires
Lead to a New Danger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/16/us/air-quality-california.html (explaining how toxins from smoke could be
potentially problematic to human health).
64. Id. (stating smog has adversely affected pollution levels in northern Cali-
fornia enough to reflect levels of those in China and India); see also Dolye Rice,
Wildfire Smoke Brings World’s Worst Air Quality to Northern California, USA TODAY
(Nov. 15, 2018, 4:04 PM),  https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/
11/15/california-fires-worlds-worst-air-quality-smoke-masks/2014817002/ (reiterat-
ing pollution from wildfires parallels world’s most polluted countries).
65. Id. (predicting long-term health effects of heightened pollution levels).
66. Id. (describing effects of breathing toxic air).
67. Francie Diep, California’s Fires are Affecting Cities’ Air Quality Dozens of Miles
Away, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 3, 2018), https://psmag.com/environment/
californias-fires-are-affecting-cities-air-quality-dozens-of-miles-away (describing how
people suffer from chronic smoke inhalation).  The exposure to the toxic air can
potentially be so severe that it may be necessary for communities to “designate
clean air centers where residents can spend time in filtered air for free.” Id. (dis-
cussing potential solution to long-term air pollution from forest fires).
68. See Turkewitz & Richtel, supra note 63 (discussing effects of poor air qual-
ity on immune system).  Extremely poor air quality can elicit a strong immune
response and is particularly more detrimental for people predisposed to asthma or
allergy. Id. (describing people most susceptible to harm).
69. See id. (discussing how California faces new danger of diminished air
quality).
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III. PG&E UNDER FIRE
If climate change is the gasoline, then human activity is the
spark that ignites the flame.70  After being linked to numerous wild-
fires, the company taking the most blame for the disasters is Califor-
nia’s largest utility provider, PG&E.71  The San Francisco-based
company “provides natural gas and electric service to approxi-
mately [sixteen] million people throughout a [seventy thousand]-
square-mile service area” in California.72  Although delivering en-
ergy is a necessary service, this fact alone is not enough to be
PG&E’s saving grace.73  CAL FIRE has subjected PG&E to wildfire
investigations on numerous occasions, and with each confirmation
of PG&E’s involvement, wildfire victims become more determined
to make the company pay.74
A. Early Mishaps
PG&E is no stranger to controversy and has been under scru-
tiny for its safety compliance for years before the wildfires.75  The
company gained notoriety on September 9, 2010, when one of their
natural gas transmission pipelines in San Bruno ruptured and re-
leased natural gas into the air.76  Chaos ensued when the escaping
gas initiated fires in the community surrounding the pipeline.77
The explosion caused eight deaths and fifty-one injuries, in addi-
tion to destroying thirty-eight homes.78  The subsequent investiga-
70. Irfan, supra note 10 (stating eighty-four percent of wildfires are caused by
humans).
71. See CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of Four Wildfires in Butte and Ne-
vada Counties, supra note 12 (discussing fires started by PG&E); see also CAL FIRE
Investigators Determine Causes of Twelve Wildfires in Mendocino, Humboldt, Butte, So-
noma, Lake, and Napa Counties, supra note 12 (attributing multiple fires to PG&E).
72. Company Profile, PG&E, https://www.pge.com/en_US/about-pge/com-
pany-information/profile/profile.page (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) (describing
breadth of PG&E’s services).
73. See id. (describing type of service provided); see also Sam Brock & David K.
Li, Raucous Protests Against California Utility PG&E that is Facing  Wildfire Claims, NBC
NEWS (Jan. 10, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/rau-
cous-protests-against-california-utility-pg-e-facing-wildfire-claims-n957351 (discuss-
ing protesters’ discontent over PG&E).
74. Id. (highlighting protesters’ pleas for no PG&E bailout).
75. See Pacific Gas & Electric Pipeline Rupture in San Bruno, CA, PIPELINE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-aware-
ness/pipeline/pacific-gas-electric-pipeline-rupture-san-bruno-ca (last visited Jan.
27, 2019) (discussing San Bruno pipeline explosion).
76. Id. (describing how explosion started).
77. Id. (discussing how fires erupted in nearby communities following
explosion).
78. Id. (describing consequences of explosion).
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tions resulted in reports of PG&E’s inadequate adherence to safety
regulations.79  In one of the preliminary investigations of the inci-
dent, the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) reported
that PG&E’s records for the pipeline contradicted the NTSB’s find-
ings at the rupture site.80  A federal jury later found PG&E guilty of
six counts, including intentionally hiding information about two
past leaks and attempting to obstruct the NTSB investigation.81  In
sentencing the company, Judge Thelton Henderson best captured
the resulting devastation of PG&E’s non-compliance:
PG&E violated the sacred trust placed in it by every person
living in or merely passing through Northern California to
follow minimum standards of safety in operating its natu-
ral gas pipelines - pipes that transport highly explosive ma-
terial under the public’s homes, freeways, and businesses.
Its deliberate and repeated choices not to do so were moti-
vated by the desire to maximize profits instead of safety -
in other words, greed.  The San Bruno explosion was not
an “accident”; it was a matter of time.  And PG&E’s efforts
to corruptly mislead the federal investigation of the explo-
sion highlight its status as a bad corporate citizen.82
Despite the Judge’s pointed words and sentence, which in-
cluded a three million dollar fine, the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) investigated PG&E for falsifying gas pipeline
records again in 2018.83  CPUC found PG&E violated rules “requir-
ing utilities to locate and mark natural gas pipelines to make sure
other companies [do not] accidentally damage them during con-
struction and other projects that involve digging.”84  In other
words, despite PG&E’s alleged commitment to “accurate and thor-
79. See id. (stating findings of explosion investigations).
80. Pacific Gas & Electric Pipeline Rupture in San Bruno, CA, supra note 75 (not-
ing inconsistencies in PG&E’s pipeline records).
81. United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 6804575, at *1-4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 17, 2016) (describing counts against PG&E).
82. United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2017 WL 1434572, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 9, 2017) (berating PG&E for safety non-compliance).
83. Sammy Roth, PG&E Falsified Gas Pipeline Records for Years After Deadly Explo-
sion, Regulators Say, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018, 4:40 PM), https://www.latimes.
com/business/la-fi-pge-safety-investigation-20181214-story.html (describing new
investigations into PG&E pipeline recording); CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http:/
/www.cpuc.ca.gov/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (describing CPUC duties).
84. Id. (describing CPUC findings).
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ough reporting and record-keeping” following the 2010 explosion,
it had maintained similar unsafe practices.85
Though it has been nearly a decade since the San Bruno pipe-
line explosion, PG&E has not redeemed itself of “its status as a bad
corporate citizen.”86  On January 30, 2019, United States District
Judge William Alsup found PG&E had “violated the terms of . . .
[its] probation by not communicating with its probation supervisors
about a legal settlement regarding a 2017 California wildfire.”87
During their probation hearing, the Judge admonished PG&E for
its lack of commitment to safety and vehemently expressed con-
cerns about PG&E continuing its business in such a manner.88
B. Involvement in the 2017 Wildfires
PG&E’s superficial adherence to safety compliance is also ap-
parent in the way it maintains its powerlines.89  After thorough in-
vestigations of the 2017 wildfires, CAL FIRE found PG&E was
responsible for sixteen of the fires in total.90  A year after the fires,
CAL FIRE released findings regarding the four wildfires in Butte
and Nevada Counties.91  For the Lobo, Honey, and McCourtney
Fires, CAL FIRE determined PG&E violated Public Resources Code
Section 4293.92  This regulation delineates the minimum distance
from which utility providers must keep their powerlines away from
trees.93  For the Lobo and Honey Fires, CAL FIRE found PG&E ac-
ted in violation of Section 4293 by failing to provide “adequate
85. See id. (contrasting PG&E’s alleged commitment to safety against
practices).
86. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2017 WL 1434572, at 10 (highlighting PG&E’s lack
of corporate responsibility); Katherine Blunt & Russell Gold, PG&E Violated Proba-
tion, Federal Judge Says in Heated Hearing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2019, 6:13 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-violated-probation-federal-judge-says-in-heated-
hearing-11548877120 (discussing PG&E’s probation following conviction).
87. Id. (detailing how PG&E violated probation terms).
88. Id. (highlighting Judge Alsup’s concern for PG&E practices).
89. See Matt Kraus, CalFire Concludes PG&E Violations Caused 2017 Wildfires,
ELEC. CONTRACTOR (May 2018), https://www.ecmag.com/section/systems/calfire-
concludes-pge-violations-caused-2017-wildfires (finding PG&E powerlines started
many 2017 wildfires).
90. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of Four Wildfires in Butte and Nevada
Counties, supra note 12 (summarizing CAL FIRE findings); CAL FIRE Investigators
Determine Causes of Twelve Wildfires in Mendocino, Humboldt, Butte, Sonoma, Lake, and
Napa Counties, supra note 12 (listing causes of additional fires).
91. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of Four Wildfires in Butte and Nevada
Counties, supra note 12 (stating causes of Butte and Nevada counties wildfires).
92. Id. (finding PG&E violated California code).
93. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4293 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 215 of 2019 Reg.
Sess.) (requiring powerlines to be sufficient distance from trees).
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clearance between trees and powerlines.”94  PG&E also violated Sec-
tion 4293 when it failed to remove a tree from the proximity of a
powerline, which CAL FIRE found to be the origin of the McCourt-
ney Fire.95  In addition, CAL FIRE determined PG&E owned the
powerline that started the La Porte Fire, though PG&E was not
cited with a violation.96  Under California’s inverse condemnation
doctrine, utility companies like PG&E are still liable for wildfires,
absent a code violation, if their equipment is involved.97
For the other twelve fires attributed to PG&E, CAL FIRE linked
the utility company’s equipment to the wildfires’ origins.98  For
many of them, PG&E’s powerlines ignited fires after a “tree or parts
of trees” fell onto them.99  Both the Redwood and Atlas Fires began
in this manner and claimed the lives of fifteen civilians in total.100
Fallen trees or tree parts hitting PG&E powerlines also caused the
Norrbom, Adobe, Patrick, and Nuns Fires.101  These fires merged
together into one large fire and claimed three civilian lives.102
In other cases, PG&E’s equipment failures initiated the fires.103
For instance, the Sulphur Fire began when a PG&E owned power
pole failed, causing powerlines and equipment to detach and
fall.104  Similarly, the Blue Fire began when a PG&E “[powerline]
conductor separated from a connector, causing it to fall to the
94. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of Four Wildfires in Butte and Nevada
Counties, supra note 12 (finding PG&E failed to maintain distance of powerlines).
95. Id. (finding PG&E failed to remove fallen tree).
96. Id. (determining branches falling on PG&E equipment caused La Porte
Fire).
97. Jeff St. John, PG&E Accused of Violating State Law in 8 Northern California
Wildfires, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 11, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/pge-accused-of-violating-state-law-in-8-northern-california-wild-
fires#gs.XZmT9tPw (stating PG&E can be liable under inverse condemnation).
98. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Causes of Twelve Wildfires in Mendocino,
Humboldt, Butte, Sonoma, Lake, and Napa Counties, supra note 12 (determining
causes of twelve 2017 wildfires).
99. Id. (finding trees hitting powerlines caused many fires).
100. Id. (stating fire causes and casualties).  The Cherokee and Pocket Fires
also began when parts of tree fell and made contact with PG&E powerlines, though
no injuries were reported. Id. (stating fallen tree limbs and top of tree as causes of
respective fires).
101. Id. (listing series of fires and their causes).
102. Id. (describing damage caused by fires).  The Pythian Fire also merged
with the Norrbom, Adobe, Patrick, and Nuns Fire. Id. (listing Pythian Fire in con-
junction with others).  Unlike the other fires involving trees, however, the Pythian
Fire began “after PG&E attempted to reenergize” a downed powerline. Id. (attrib-
uting Pythian Fire cause to PG&E’s electrical malfunction).
103. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Causes of Twelve Wildfires in Mendocino,
Humboldt, Butte, Sonoma, Lake, and Napa Counties, supra note 12 (discussing fires
caused by PG&E’s equipment failures).
104. Id. (describing formation of Sulpher Fire).
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ground, starting the fire.”105  PG&E’s faulty distribution lines ig-
nited the Thirty-Seven Fire.106
To PG&E’s relief, CAL FIRE found that the company’s facilities
were not responsible for the infamous Tubbs Fire.107  The Tubbs
Fire, one of the largest infernos in 2017, burned 36,807 acres and
ravaged entire neighborhoods in Santa Rosa.108  CAL FIRE deter-
mined a malfunction of a private electric system caused the fire,
leading to the deaths of twenty-two civilians and injured one fire-
fighter.109
C. Scrutiny in 2018
After a thorough investigation, CAL FIRE confirmed what
many had long suspected: PG&E’s equipment caused “the deadliest
and most destructive fire in California history.”110  The fire earning
such an infamous title is the Camp Fire, which left 153,336 acres
scorched in its aftermath.111  Early in its investigations, CAL FIRE
reported two Camp Fire origin points, both involving PG&E facili-
ties.112  One of the origin points was PG&E’s Caribou-Palermo
transmission line, and the other was PG&E’s Big Bend distribution
line.113  The first sign of trouble was when PG&E discovered a mal-
function at its Caribou-Palermo transmission line.114  CAL FIRE re-
ported the Camp Fire began fifteen minutes after this outage.115
PG&E then experienced a second outage at its Big Bend distribu-
105. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Causes of Twelve Wildfires in Mendocino,
Humboldt, Butte, Sonoma, Lake, and Napa Counties, supra note 12 (describing forma-
tion of Blue Fire).
106. Id. (describing fires started by PG&E’s faulty distribution lines).
107. See CAL FIRE Investigators Determine the Cause of the Tubbs Fire, CAL FIRE
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5032/tubbscause1v.pdf (deter-
mining private electrical system caused Tubbs Fire).
108. Id. (stating acreage burned by Tubbs Fire); Morris & Johnson, supra note
43 (describing Tubbs Fire devastation in Santa Rosa).
109. Id. (describing Tubbs Fire casualties).
110. See CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of the Camp Fire, supra note 51
(confirming PG&E involvement in Camp Fire).
111. Id. (describing Camp Fire damage).
112. Ronald Li, Numerous PG&E Employees Saw Flames Soon After Camp Fire
Started, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 31, 2018, 7:58 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/califor
nia-wildfires/article/Numerous-PG-E-employees-saw-flames-soon-after-1350118
8.php (stating Camp Fire origin points).
113. Id. (describing PG&E’s facilities near Camp Fire origin points).
114. Id. (stating first malfunction on day of Camp Fire).
115. See Maria Armental, PG&E Says Equipment Failed Just Before California Wild-
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tion line, which sparked another fire.116  The original fire con-
sumed the subsequent flames, creating one large inferno.117  It
burned rapidly through Butte County and drew strength from the
area’s “strong winds, low humidity, and warm temperatures.”118  Al-
though the weather conditions exacerbated the situation, PG&E
did not deny the role of its equipment in initiating the fires.119
D. Bankruptcy and the Fallout of the Investigations
Amidst scrutiny emanating from the wildfires, PG&E signaled
it was realizing the consequences of its role in the disasters.120  At
the beginning of 2019, Geisha Williams stepped down as PG&E’s
Chief Executive Officer, and the board named former General
Counsel John Simon as interim CEO.121  This change in leadership,
along with three other top executives stepping down, signified
prominent attempts at reforming PG&E in response to the
wildfires.122
On January 29, 2019, PG&E filed for bankruptcy in San Fran-
cisco.123  The company sought Chapter Eleven protections, making
it “one of the largest corporate-reorganization cases in years,” and
the sixth largest bankruptcy filing of all time.124  It is uncommon
for a utility provider to file for bankruptcy because its status as a
natural monopoly guarantees financial returns.125  The most recent
filing represents the second time PG&E has filed for bankruptcy in
less than twenty years, and it has done so due to the litigation from
116. See Li, supra note 112 (discussing second outage at Big Bend distribution
line).
117. See CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of the Camp Fire, supra note 51
(discussing Camp Fire’s rapid growth).
118. Id. (explaining conditions promoting Camp Fire).
119. See Peter Eavis, PG&E Says It Probably Caused the Fire That Destroyed Para-
dise, Cal., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/busi-
ness/energy-environment/pge-camp-fire.html (discussing PG&E’s assertion it
started Camp Fire).
120. See Katherine Blunt & Russell Gold, PG&E Files for Bankruptcy Following
California Wildfires, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2019, 1:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/pg-e-files-for-bankruptcy-following-california-wildfires-11548750142 (dis-
cussing PG&E’s bankruptcy filing amidst lawsuits).
121. Id. (discussing CEO resignation).
122. Id. (discussing PG&E’s plans to change board after wildfires); J.D. Mor-
ris, Three PG&E Electric Executives Departing Amid Ongoing Wildfire Scrutiny, S.F.
CHRON. (Jan. 8, 2019, 9:27 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/
article/3-PG-E-electric-executives-departing-amid-ongoing-13517735.php (discuss-
ing top PG&E executives’ retirements).
123. Id. (discussing PG&E bankruptcy decision).
124. Id. (describing significance of second PG&E bankruptcy).
125. Blunt & Gold, supra note 120 (highlighting monopolistic nature of utility
providers).
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the wildfires.126  The company stated it faces complaints from
thousands of wildfire victims, resulting in thirty billion dollars in
potential liability.127  Judge Dennis Montali presides over PG&E’s
current bankruptcy proceedings.128  This is not Judge Montali’s first
time overseeing the company’s reorganization, as he also presided
over PG&E’s bankruptcy in 2001.129
Despite financial uncertainty, PG&E has expressed its top pri-
ority is to “keep the lights on,” and Judge Montali has been sympa-
thetic to this goal.130  The Judge issued an interim order permitting
the company to spend $1.5 billion of a $5.5 billion bank loan to
prevent service disruption during the bankruptcy proceedings.131
Judge Montali also granted PG&E’s request to pay employees ap-
proximately $235 million in bonuses, which PG&E claimed will be
used to “achiev[e] safety goals and . . . promote stability in the
workforce amid the chaos surrounding the company.”132
While exoneration for the Tubbs Fire grants PG&E some relief,
the company could still face massive liabilities.133  A bankruptcy
court may provide additional relief for PG&E, but this comes at a
cost for both the utility provider and its consumers.134  For instance,
PG&E attempted to cancel numerous contracts committing it to
purchasing solar, wind, and other renewable energy for use all over
126. See id. (discussing impact of potential liabilities on company).
127. Id. (discussing extent of potential liabilities).
128. Joel Rosenblatt, PG&E Bankruptcy is Deja vu for Judge Who Handled 2001
Filing, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2019, 8:49 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-01-29/pg-e-bankruptcy-is-deja-vu-for-judge-who-handled-2001-filing
(describing judge’s connection to PG&E).
129. Id. (describing Judge Montali’s PG&E reorganization in 2001).
130. Nick Zieminski, Bankrupted by Deadly Wildfires, PG&E Vows to Keep the
Lights On, YAHOO FINANCE (Jan. 30, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ban-
krupted-deadly-wildfires-pg-e-152227764.html (describing PG&E’s vow to continue
services).
131. Bankruptcy Judge Issues Interim Orders Allowing PG&E to Continue Operations,
S.F. GATE (Jan. 31, 2019, 8:33 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/news/bayarea/arti-
cle/Bankruptcy-Judge-Issues-Interim-Orders-Allowing-13579426.php (discussing
interim orders).
132. Dale Kasler, Judge Oks $235 Million in Bonuses for PG&E Employees, as Com-
pany Struggles with Bankruptcy, SACRAMENTO BEE (April 23, 2019, 4:20 PM), https://
www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article229603929.html (discussing approval of em-
ployee bonuses and intended purpose).
133. Blunt & Gold, supra note 120 (detailing liabilities despite Tubbs Fire
finding).
134. See Paul Rogers, Are California’s Solar and Wind Projects at Risk in PG&E
Bankruptcy?, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.mercurynews.
com/2019/01/30/what-happens-to-californias-solar-and-wind-energy-with-pge-
bankruptcy/ (explaining how bankruptcy jeopardizes prospects for sustainability).
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California.135  PG&E committed to these “power purchase agree-
ments” years ago to transition to more renewable energy sources
and conform with California’s environmental goals.136  As a result
of its unprecedented liabilities, PG&E requested that the bank-
ruptcy court “bar federal regulators from requiring that its con-
tracts be left intact.”137  If permitted to cancel the contracts, PG&E
would save money that could be used to stay in business, but it
would be at the cost of foregoing potentially sustainable resources
and practices for the future.138
When a sizable corporation like PG&E suffers, so do the
thousands of people who rely on it.139  Californians who survived
the wildfires could find their recovery burdened by the bank-
ruptcy.140  PG&E’s filing could hinder the ability of fire victims to
recover losses and increase already inflated electricity rates for ex-
isting customers.141  Conflicting interests will inevitably converge, as
consumers resist paying higher prices and creditors pressure the
company for financial viability.142
IV. CALIFORNIA WILDFIRE REGULATION: THEN AND NOW
As PG&E’s bankruptcy proceedings continue, the challenge is
balancing the interests of victims, consumers, creditors, environ-
mentalists, and the company itself.143  The overwhelming interests
of these parties place pressure on the California legislature and
other notable politicians.144  To understand fully California’s wild-
135. Id. (discussing PG&E’s decision to cancel contracts for sustainable
technology).
136. Id. (describing PG&E’s decision to enter contracts).  California planned
to rely entirely on zero-emission energy sources for its electricity by 2045.  Camila
Domonsoke, California Sets Goal of One Hundred Percent Clean Electric Power by 2045,
NPR (Sept. 10, 2018, 3:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646373423/
california-sets-goal-of-100-percent-renewable-electric-power-by-2045 (outlining Cal-
ifornia’s goals for greener future).
137. Rogers, supra note 134 (discussing contract cancellation in bankruptcy).
138. Id. (discussing PG&E’s strategy to avoid commitments and save costs).
139. Blunt & Gold, supra note 120 (discussing bankruptcy’s negative effect on
PG&E consumers).
140. Id. (predicting negative consequences of bankruptcy).
141. Id. (explaining how fire victims and customers will pay for bankruptcy).
142. Ivan Penn, PG&E Bankruptcy Filing Creates ‘A Real Mess’ for Rival Interests,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/business/en-
ergy-environment/pge-file-bankruptcy.html (describing divergent interests of con-
sumers and creditors).
143. See id. (discussing difficulty of resolving conflicting interests).
144. Phil Willon, Newsom Tested Right Out of the Gate with Teacher’s Strike and
PG&E Crisis, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/polit-
ics/la-pol-ca-governor-gavin-newsom-crisis-strike-utility-20190128-story.html
(describing public pressure on Governor Newsom to act).
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fire crisis, it is important to know how the state previously tried to
mitigate against wildfires started by utility providers.145  Former
Governor Jerry Brown’s attempts to remedy the damage, and in-
cumbent Governor Gavin Newsom’s assurances that PG&E will be
held accountable, are also significant in understanding California’s
present landscape for wildfire regulation.146
A. Inverse Condemnation
CAL FIRE reported PG&E’s equipment started fires, despite
not citing the company with a violation of California’s Public Re-
sources Codes.147  Under the state’s inverse condemnation doc-
trine, PG&E is still liable to wildfire victims because its equipment
was involved.148  States have typically used inverse condemnation to
hold government agencies accountable when they “damage private
property while providing a public service.”149  California courts
have expanded this doctrine to allow property owners to hold both
public and private utilities accountable when their equipment
causes damages.150  The rationale behind this policy is that the state
authorizes utilities “to provide a vital public service.”151  The court
of appeals in Barham v. Southern California Edison Co.152 applied Cali-
fornia’s inverse condemnation in finding Southern California
Edison Company (“SCE”) liable for wildfire damage.153  In Barham,
SCE experienced an overhead powerline equipment failure, which
ignited the Mill Creek Fire.154  After the fire destroyed their homes,
many property owners sought to recover their losses from the utility
company.155  The district court applied inverse condemnation to
award the plaintiffs damages from SCE, and the court of appeals
145. Id. (describing Newsom’s promises regarding utility company
accountability).
146. See id. (discussing difficulty Newsom administration faces with PG&E).
147. For a discussion of when PG&E equipment started wildfires, see supra
notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
148. David R. Baker, The California Rule that Doomed PG&E: Inverse Condemna-
tion, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2019, 11:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-01-15/the-california-rule-that-doomed-pg-e-inverse-condemnation
(discussing holding companies liable under inverse condemnation).
149. Id. (explaining typical inverse condemnation application).
150. Id. (detailing California’s unique application for doctrine).
151. Id. (explaining California’s justification for expanding inverse
condemnation).
152. Barham v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 74 Cal. App. 4th 744, 752 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (describing property owners’ suit against SCE).
153. Id. (reasoning inverse condemnation applicable).
154. Id. at 748-49 (discussing factual background).
155. Id. at 747-48 (explaining plaintiffs’ interest in applying inverse
condemnation).
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affirmed.156  The court of appeals ruled “[a]n inverse condemna-
tion action is an eminent domain action by one whose property was
taken for public use.”157  It further found “condemning private
property for the transmission of electrical power” constituted a pub-
lic use.158  Even though SCE was a private company, the court sub-
jected it to inverse condemnation liability because its role was to
provide electrical power, which is a public use.159
Unsurprisingly, utility providers are averse to the inverse con-
demnation doctrine, and PG&E even credits California’s interpreta-
tion of the doctrine for its bankruptcy.160  Former PG&E CEO
Geisha Williams called inverse condemnation “simply bad public
policy[,]” blaming it for falling stock prices and the decision to sus-
pend dividends to shareholders.161  Courts, on the other hand,
think it is more equitable for utility providers, who have more
money than disaster victims, to pay damages that would not have
happened without their equipment.162  PG&E argues that despite
its size, generating the money to pay for these damages is compli-
cated, especially because they do not determine “whether the
money comes from customers or investors.”163  Instead, CPUC de-
cides where the funds can be taken from.164  PG&E has challenged
the extent of CPUC’s control because the company faces enormous
liabilities, and CPUC prevents them from charging customers
higher rates to help mitigate these costs.165  Based on this reason-
ing, PG&E challenged California’s inverse condemnation doctrine
156. Id. at 747 (outlining procedural background).
157. Barham, 744 Cal. App. 4th at 752 (defining inverse condemnation).
158. Id. (characterizing providing electrical services as public use).
159. Id. at 752-53 (rejecting SCE’s argument that inverse condemnation is not
applicable to private companies).
160. Taryn Luna, Let PG&E ‘Off the Hook’ for Wildfire Costs? If Not, Your Utility
Bills Could Rise, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 10, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://
www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article208200204.html
(discussing PG&E challenging inverse condemnation).
161. Id. (explaining impact of inverse condemnation on PG&E’s financial
performance).
162. Peter Bradford, Making PG&E Pay More Than its Fair Share of Fire Damage
Could Backfire on the State, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 31, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://
www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article212316269.html (explaining
courts’ justification for inverse condemnation).
163. Id. (explaining PG&E’s lack of control in decision-making).
164. Id. (highlighting CPUC’s power over PG&E).
165. See Petition for Review at 8-18, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Super Ct. of Cal.
for Cty. S.F., No. S251585 (Cal. Sept. 27, 2018), http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/
files/doc_downloads/2018/wildfire/10/Inverse-Writ-Supreme-Court-Petition-for-
Review-FINAL.PDF (discussing how litigation costs cannot be mitigated through
consumer rates).
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in the state’s supreme court.166  In its court filing, PG&E asserted
that California courts assume utilities are just like government enti-
ties that can spread their costs among the public by manipulating
taxes.167  However, PG&E does not have this ability, as CPUC has
discretion on this matter.168  According to PG&E, it is “caught in a
whipsaw between unlimited strict inverse condemnation liability . . .
and the CPUC’s refusal to take that liability into account in rate
recovery.”169  PG&E argues the result of their circumstances is
bankruptcy derived from exponential liability and an inability to
pursue the appropriate means of reducing it.170
B. Governor Brown’s Enactment of Senate Bill 901
In the final months of Governor Brown’s term, he faced the
difficult task of deciding what to do with PG&E amidst contentious
years of wildfires.171  Before leaving office, Governor Brown signed
Senate Bill 901 into law, which addressed some of PG&E’s concerns
regarding its inability to charge higher rates.172  Senate Bill 901 spe-
cifically permits CPUC to “allow cost recovery if the costs and ex-
penses are just and reasonable, after consideration of the conduct
of the utility.”173  The legislation also lists twelve factors CPUC can
use to determine whether PG&E acted reasonably in maintaining
its equipment.174  If PG&E meets this “reasonableness” standard,
166. Id. (blaming lack of control over rates for financial trouble).
167. See id. (characterizing courts’ premise for admonishing PG&E as
incorrect).
168. See id. (explaining courts’ and CPUC’ adverse impact on PG&E
recovery).
169. Id. at 11 (asserting PG&E burdened because CPUC and courts lack in-
sight into its ability to pay liabilities).
170. See Petition for Review, supra note 165, at 18 (concluding PG&E lacks
recourse without ability to spread costs among public).
171. See George Avalos, Brown Signs Wildfire Safety Bill Blasted as PG&E Bailout,
MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 21, 2018, 11:56 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/
09/21/brown-signs-bill-allowing-utilities-to-pass-costs-of-wildfire-lawsuits-onto-con-
sumers/ (describing backlash of Governor Brown’s legislation).
172. See generally 2017 CA S.B. 901 (Cal. 2018) (allowing PG&E to charge
higher consumer rates under certain circumstances).
173. Id. § 26 (describing when CPUC should allow PG&E to charge higher
rates).
174. See id. (emphasizing PG&E must meet standard to increase rates).  To
determine whether the “costs and expenses are just and reasonable[,]” CPUC must
consider the following:
(1) The nature and severity of the conduct of the electrical corporation
and its officers, employees, contractors, and other entities with which the
electrical corporation forms a contractual relationship, including sys-
temic corporate defects.  (2) Whether the electrical corporation disre-
garded indicators of wildfire risk.  (3) Whether the electrical corporation
failed to design its assets in a reasonable manner.  (4) Whether the elec-
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CPUC will allow recovery through consumer rates.175  In addition,
for the 2017 wildfires, the bill instructs CPUC to consider PG&E’s
“financial status and determine the maximum amount the corpora-
tion can pay without harming ratepayers or materially impacting its
ability to provide adequate and safe service.”176  Costs that exceed
this determined amount “would be allowed to be covered through
bonds issued by PG&E and backed by increased rates on custom-
ers.”177  Supporters of the bill seek the longevity of PG&E, as they
believe its financial ruin could have tumultuous economic and en-
ergy-related effects in the long run.178
In contrast, some Californian constituents have expressed con-
cerns over Senate Bill 901.179  Opponents of the bill called it a
“bailout” for PG&E, believing it is a way for the company to pass
wildfire costs onto consumers.180  While this bill allows PG&E to use
consumer rates to pay liabilities under the appropriate circum-
trical corporation failed to operate its assets in a reasonable manner.  (5)
Whether the electrical corporation failed to maintain its assets in a rea-
sonable manner.  (6) Whether the electrical corporation’s practices to
monitor, predict, and anticipate wildfires, and to operate its facilities in a
reasonable manner based on information gained from its monitoring
and predicting of wildfires, were reasonable.  (7) The extent to which the
costs and expenses were in part caused by circumstances beyond the elec-
trical corporation’s control.  (8) Whether extreme climate change condi-
tions at the location of the wildfire’s ignition, including humidity,
temperature, or winds occurring during the wildfire, contributed to the
fire’s ignition or exacerbated the extent of the damages.  The electrical
corporation shall provide the commission with specific evidence and data
demonstrating the impact of climate conditions on the severity of the
wildfire.  (9) The electrical corporation’s compliance with regulations,
laws, commission orders, and its wildfire mitigation plans prepared pursu-
ant to Section 8386, including its history of compliance.  (10) Official
findings of state, local or federal government offices summarizing statu-
tory, regulatory, or ordinance violations by any actor that contributed to
the extent of the damages.  (11) Whether the costs and expenses were
caused by a single violation or multiple violations of relevant rules.  (12)
Other factors the commission finds necessary to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the costs and expenses, including factors traditionally relied upon
by the commission in its decisions.
175. Id. (explaining grounds for allowing recovery through consumer rates).
176. Id. § 27 (detailing CPUC considerations).
177. Jeff St. John, California Lawmakers Pass PG&E Wildfire Relief Bill, Let Grid
Regionalization Expire, GREENTECH MEDIA (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.greentech
media.com/articles/read/california-passes-pge-wildfire-relief-bill-but-grid-regional
ization-fails#gs.yDXPqPbs (explaining how PG&E will pay for liabilities).
178. See id. (stating bill supporters’ concerns over PG&E bankruptcy).
179. Avalos, supra note 171 (describing opponents’ characterizing legislation
as bailout).
180. Id. (discussing opponents’ belief bill constitutes bailout).
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stances, there is a major setback for the company.181  Senate Bill
901 does not include the 2018 wildfires.182  In other words, PG&E is
not immune from any of the costs associated with the Camp Fire.183
Another important aspect of Senate Bill 901 is its efforts to ex-
pand utility companies’ existing wildfire mitigation require-
ments.184  For instance, electrical corporations will now be required
to submit wildfire mitigation plans to CPUC, which CPUC must re-
view and approve within three months of submission.185  Addition-
ally, the bill requires increased communication between CPUC and
CAL FIRE so that they work in conjunction to monitor the condi-
tions of fire-prone areas before a blaze starts.186  This legislation
also creates a new department, the Commission on Catastrophic
Wildfire Cost and Recovery, designed specifically to examine the
propensity of utility infrastructure in starting catastrophic wild-
fires.187  Throughout Governor Brown’s term in office, Californians
considered him an ally to utilities, and the former Governor’s deci-
sion to sign this bill was consistent with that reputation.188
C. Governor Newsom’s “Accountability” Approach to Wildfire
Liability
Governor Gavin Newsom took office in early 2019, and with
assurances from his campaign that PG&E would be held accounta-
ble, the current Governor will have a different relationship with
PG&E than his predecessor.189  Governor Newsom has a history
with the company that began when he served as mayor of San Fran-
cisco, where PG&E is based.190  As mayor, Governor Newsom was
“friendly with the company[,]” and PG&E and its top executives
181. See John Myers, One Small Change to California’s Wildfire Prevention Law
Could Spark a Huge Political Fight in Sacramento, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-wildfire-legislature-utilities-cost-
20181203-story.html (describing gap in Senate Bill 901).
182. Id. (explaining Senate Bill 901 overlooks 2018 wildfires).
183. See id. (describing financial concerns due to unfavorable legislation).
184. See generally 2017 CA S.B. 901 (discussing changes to wildfire mitigation).
185. Id. § 38 (requiring new submission process).  Electrical corporations are
to submit their wildfire mitigation plans to CPUC according to a schedule deter-
mined by CPUC. Id.
186. Id. § 41 (discussing increased communication between organizations).
187. Id. (creating new commission).
188. See David R. Baker, Embattled PG&E Has Long History with California’s New
Governor, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-12-02/embattled-pg-e-has-long-history-with-california-s-new-
governor (describing Governor Brown’s reputation with PG&E).
189. Id. (predicting Governor Newsom’s relationship with PG&E).
190. Id. (providing background on Newsom’s term as San Francisco mayor).
21
Melo: We Didn't Start the Fire…Did We?  Analyzing Why California Cannot
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
186 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31: p. 165
were even known to donate to his gubernatorial campaign.191  How-
ever, the Governor was also firm with PG&E regarding certain is-
sues and rebuked the utility for multiple equipment failures,
including one that sparked an explosion and seriously injured a pe-
destrian.192  Later, when Governor Newsom served as California’s
lieutenant governor, he used his authority over PG&E to close the
state’s last nuclear plant.193
In addition to accountability, Governor Newsom expressed
concerns over PG&E’s solvency to the extent it affects California
residents.194  The Governor’s office is collaborating with regulators
and PG&E personnel to find a solution to the embattled company’s
financial troubles.195  Governor Newsom expressed his desire to
keep PG&E financially secure enough to continue its services.196  In
furtherance of this goal, the Governor appointed three people to
the five-member Commission on Catastrophic Wildfire Cost and
Recovery, which was formed under Senate Bill 901.197  The Com-
mission - now consisting of a former state Insurance Commissioner,
San Francisco attorney, and former CPUC member - must produce
a detailed report for the Governor and the California Legislature
that recommends changes to ensure “equitable distribution of
costs” following the fires.198  Governor Newsom also made his first
appointment to CPUC with Genevieve Shiroma, a member of Cali-
fornia’s Agriculture Labor Relations Board who has experience
working with air quality.199
In addition to these appointments, “Newsom also signed an ex-
ecutive order to prioritize state emergency management spending
191. Id. (stating friendly relations between Newsom and PG&E).
192. Id. (describing instances Newsom reprimanded company).
193. Baker, supra note 188 (describing Newsom’s role in closing PG&E’s nu-
clear plant).
194. J.D. Morris, Newsom Weighs in on PG&E’s Murky Future in Wake of Camp
Fire, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 9, 2019, 3:27 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-
wildfires/article/Newsom-weighs-in-on-PG-E-s-murky-future-in-the-13521704.php
(addressing Newsom’s plans to promote PG&E solvency).
195. Id. (describing collaborative efforts between Newsom and PG&E).
196. See id. (claiming Newsom wants PG&E financial viability for state’s
residents).
197. Alexei Koseff, Gov. Gavin Newsom Names Three to California Wildfires Panel,
S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-
wildfires/article/Gov-Gavin-Newsom-names-three-to-California-13556130.php (dis-
cussing new CPUC appointment).
198. Id. (describing duties of new appointments).
199. Kathleen Ronayne, Newsom Announces Nominee for California Utility Regula-
tor, NBC SAN DIEGO (Jan. 23, 2019, 5:34 AM), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/
news/california/Newsom-Announces-Nominee-for-California-Utility-Regulator-
504739812.html (discussing Siroma’s appointment).
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on communities at high risk during natural disasters.”200  The Gov-
ernor also “signed a second executive order to better streamline the
procurement for state emergency agencies modernizing their
equipment.”201  Although Governor Newsom voiced his commit-
ment to wildfire victims, Californians have high expectations for the
Governor that include: fulfilling his assurances of accountability,
calling for PG&E transparency, approaching remedial efforts by
PG&E with skepticism, and insisting on CPUC reform.202
V. WHO STARTED THE FIRE?
The question of who is responsible for the California wildfires
is a contentious inquiry, yielding not one definite culprit but multi-
ple.203  With CAL FIRE’s numerous reports of PG&E’s involvement,
many Californians blame PG&E.204  PG&E opponents seek to make
an example out of the utility provider and allow its financial ruin to
be retribution for its disregard of safety.205  Judge Alsup best cap-
tured the anger against PG&E when he faced the company for its
probation hearing:
To my mind, there’s a very clear-cut pattern here: that
PG&E is starting these fires[.] . . . What do we do? Does
the judge just turn a blind eye and say, ‘PG&E, continue
your business as usual. Kill more people by starting more
fires’? . . . Will we be seeing headlines: ‘PG&E has done it
again?[‘] . . . Started another fire and some other town
burned down because you didn’t turn the power off or
you didn’t cut the trees?206
200. Phil Willon, Gov. Gavin Newsom Announces Plans to Improve California’s
Wildfire Prevention Efforts, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://www.latimes.
com/politics/la-pol-ca-governor-gavin-newsom-wildfires-20190108-story.html (ex-
plaining how executive order will help wildfire prevention). Some of these com-
munities are areas that “based on geography, are more disaster-prone or that have
more vulnerable populations – including the elderly, who have more difficulty
evacuating.” Id.
201. Id. (describing purpose of second executive order).
202. Sacramento Bee Editorial Board, PG&E’s Crimes and Negligence Demand
Action, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 11, 2019, 11:50 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/opin-
ion/editorials/article224290720.html (listing actions Newsom can take to decrease
chances of wildfires).
203. For a discussion of the varying accounts of what started the wildfires, see
infra notes 222-236 and accompanying text.
204. Ayer & Glover, supra note 9 (highlighting anger directed at PG&E for
involvement in wildfires).
205. See Avalos, supra note 171 (describing anger at Senate Bill providing re-
lief for PG&E).
206. Richard Gonzales, Federal Judge Blasts PG&E’s Commitment to California
Wildfire Safety, NPR (Jan. 30, 2019, 10:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/30/
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On the other hand, PG&E and its sympathizers are also correct
in crediting climate change with creating a hostile environment
that breeds wildfires.207  Those dismayed by PG&E’s bankruptcy call
it a “the first major corporate casualty of climate change.”208  They
believe PG&E’s troubles began because it was overwhelmed by ex-
treme weather conditions that dramatically increase the risk of fire,
such as prolonged droughts and high temperatures.209  In their
opinion, PG&E never stood a chance against climate change on its
own.210  As a result, they also blame the State of California.211
PG&E’s proponents question how California expected one com-
pany to oversee one hundred twenty million trees across one hun-
dred twenty-five thousand miles of powerlines.212  They criticize the
state for using its inverse condemnation doctrine to force PG&E to
pay for liabilities it did not cause and for allowing CPUC to deter-
mine how PG&E uses its money.213  Essentially, PG&E must pay for
non-negligent liabilities with limited funds, while simultaneously
trying to meet the state’s demands for greener technology.214
PG&E’s bankruptcy has opened opportunities for other electrical
companies to take its place, but even they have been unable to as-
sume all PG&E’s responsibilities.215  San Francisco began switching
portions of the city from PG&E’s electrical services to Cle-
anPowerSF, which derives almost half of its power from renewable
690196239/federal-judge-blasts-pg-es-commitment-to-california-wildfire-safety
(quoting Judge Alsup in PG&E’s probationary hearing).
207. Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the
Last, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 18, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-
wildfires-and-the-first-climate-change-bankruptcy-11547820006 (arguing climate
change is largely to blame for wildfires).
208. Id. (attributing PG&E’s turmoil to climate change victim).
209. Id. (arguing PG&E could not keep up with climate change).
210. See Chunka Mui, PG&E is Just the First of Many Climate Change Bankruptcies,
FORBES (Jan. 24, 2019, 10:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/
2019/01/24/pge-is-just-the-first-of-many-climate-change-bankruptcies/
#fb03de07e5ff (explaining difficult nature of climate change).
211. See id. (explaining state’s unrealistic expectations for PG&E).
212. Id. (arguing impossible for PG&E to provide energy services to all cus-
tomers and maintain each powerline).
213. For a discussion of CPUC’s discretion over PG&E’s finances, see supra
notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of PG&E’s contentions with California’s inverse con-
demnation doctrine, see supra notes 160-170 and accompanying text.
215. See Dominic Fracassa, CleanPowerSF Tripling Households Served with Munici-
pal Electricity, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 14, 2019, 4:56 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
bayarea/article/CleanPowerSF-tripling-households-served-with-13618155.php?
utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=headlines&utm_cam
paign=sfc_morningfix (describing CleanPowerSF’s reliance on PG&E in its
business).
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sources.216  While CleanPowerSF is increasing the number of
households served, it relies on PG&E to help with matters such as
distribution and outages, supporting the argument that maintain-
ing PG&E’s infrastructure is an arduous task.217
In addition, other critics, such as President Trump, believe the
state should have taken more responsibility in its forest manage-
ment.218  After his visit to Paradise, President Trump tweeted,
“[b]illions of dollars are given each year, with so many lives lost, all
because of gross mismanagement of the forests.”219  Some forestry
experts agree with President Trump’s controversial assertion, claim-
ing communities sat idly while California forests grew thick with
trees and their wood debris, which were perfect for fueling
wildfires.220
Different perspectives yield different sources of the 2017 and
2018 California wildfires, but ultimately, there is truth in each asser-
tion.221  The wildfires resulted not from a single source, but from a
totality of different factors exacerbating each other over the
years.222  In other words, climate change, PG&E, and California it-
self are all culpable in their own distinct ways.223
The effects of climate change made areas in California expo-
nentially more susceptible to wildfires.224  As a result, wildfires be-
gan to burn more frequently and out of the traditional wildfire
216. Id. (differentiating CleanPowerSF from PG&E).
217. See id. (suggesting CleanPowerSF incapable of handling PG&E’s
infrastructure).




tics%2Fcalifornia-wildfires-trump-tweets%2Findex.html (suggesting state is at
fault).
219. Id. (blaming gross mismanagement of forests for wildfires).
220. See Peter Fimrite & Kurtis Alexander, California’s Year-Round Wildfire
Threat: Why Aren’t Communities Doing More?, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 10, 2018), https://
www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/article/California-s-year-round-wildfire-
threat-Why-13379734.php (discussing argument California failed to maintain
forests).
221. See Berke & Varinsky, supra note 26 (crediting climate change for wild-
fire crisis); Kraus, supra note 89 (describing CAL FIRE reports confirming PG&E
caused 2017 wildfires); Mui, supra note 210 (arguing high California expectations
for PG&E to maintain all powerlines and monitor outages).
222. See Irfan, supra note 10 (arguing humans cause fires in areas where cli-
mate change increased risk).
223. For a discussion of how aggravating factors triggered intense wildfires,
see infra notes 224-235 and accompanying text.
224. For a discussion of how climate change leads to increase in wildfires, see
supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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season.225  Parts of Australia are similarly experiencing conditions
that promote wildfires, strongly supporting the argument that Cali-
fornia is not an anomaly and climate change is in fact causing wild-
fires.226  The National Climate Change Adaption Research Facility
in Australia reported that the country’s heat waves have become an
annual ordeal, instead of being limited to its summer months – De-
cember, January, and February.227  Like California, rising tempera-
tures in Australia are causing several wildfires to burn at once,
exposing vulnerable parts of the country to unprecedented
damage.228
However, climate change does not exclude PG&E from
blame.229  The company has a history of cutting corners when it
comes to safety and purposefully defying regulations designed to
prevent wildfires.230  PG&E has not shied away from recognizing its
own culpability, especially when it assumed responsibility for the
Camp Fire long before CAL FIRE’s official determination.231
In addition, the need for better wildfire regulation implicates
the state and highlights its role in the wildfire crisis.232  Some
Californians perceive Senate Bill 901 and Governor Newsom’s ac-
countability platform as policies that should have been in place
years ago to avoid the most recent calamities.233  California is par-
tially at fault because despite signs suggesting PG&E was struggling
225. Berke & Varinsky, supra note 26 (explaining why wildfires burn out of
season).
226. See Jamie Tarabay, Across Australia, Yet Another Scorching Summer, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/world/australia/
heat-wave-horses.html?module=inline (discussing wildfires in Australia).
227. Id. (linking wildfires to heat waves); Seasons, AUSTL. GOV’T BUREAU OF
METEOROLOGY, http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/glossary/seasons.shtml (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2019) (stating summer months in Australia).
228. See Tarabay, supra note 226 (describing number of wildfires in Australia).
229. See CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of Four Wildfires in Butte and Ne-
vada Counties, supra note 12 (listing PG&E’s faults in 2017 wildfires); see also CAL
FIRE Investigators Determine Causes of Twelve Wildfires in Mendocino, Humboldt, Butte,
Sonoma, Lake, and Napa Counties, supra note 12 (listing PG&E’s faults in additional
wildfires).
230. For a discussion of PG&E’s wrongdoings, see supra notes 75-106 and ac-
companying text.
231. See Eavis, supra note 119 (discussing PG&E’s assuming responsibility for
Camp Fire).
232. See Chuck DeVore, Trump’s Right About California Wildfires: It Wasn’t Cli-
mate Change; Two New California Laws Prove it, FORBES (Nov. 27, 10:43 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2018/11/27/trumps-right-about-californias-
fires-it-wasnt-climate-change-two-new-california-laws-prove-it/#2baa0a5b22e3 (ar-
guing new wildfire bill supports argument state is to blame).
233. See id. (suggesting California could have avoided wildfires if policies were
in place years ago).
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for years, the state failed to see the company’s shortcomings were
part of a larger systemic problem.234  The remedial measures of
both Governors Brown and Newsom prove California is only now
noticing how overwhelmed PG&E was in maintaining its massive in-
frastructure amidst worsening environmental conditions.235  While
business executives and politicians are eager to point fingers at one
another, there is simply no single identifiable source, as they all
played a significant role in the wildfire crisis.236
Without implementing changes, such as slowing down climate
change and enforcing safety compliance, the wildfires will
worsen.237  Their destruction hurts everyone – the state, residents,
and businesses.238  PG&E surrendered most of its control to a bank-
ruptcy court, while California struggles to rebuild after the wild-
fires.239  Unfortunately, the people who suffer the most are the
surviving victims of the wildfires.240  A housing crisis, potential long-
term health ailments, and little opportunity for recompense hinder
234. See Mui, supra note 210 (claiming climate change inflicts near-term pain
for businesses).
235. Id. (discussing hardships PG&E faced because of climate change).  In
response to political pressure, PG&E spent $435 million to clear dead trees and
removed about four hundred thousand trees, in addition to the 1.4 million trees it
prunes annually. Id. (describing PG&E efforts to offset climate change conse-
quences).  Because of climate change, however, the company’s efforts had little
impact. Id. (suggesting PG&E could not maintain every tree in California).
236. Id. (suggesting California’s expectations for PG&E were unrealistic);
DeVore, supra note 232 (arguing new laws could have alleviated California’s wild-
fire damage sooner).
237. Is Global Warming Fueling Increased Wildfire Risks?, supra note 32 (stating
high chances for more wildfires if no reduction in greenhouse gasses); Pierre-
Louis & Popovich, supra note 39 (concluding more wildfires will lead to increased
emissions).
238. California Wildfire Costs Soar Past Last Year’s Records, supra note 60 (detail-
ing financial burden of wildfires on state); Wildfire Victims Thrust into Northern Cali-
fornia Housing Shortage, supra note 53 (stating displaced families unsure of
housing); Blunt & Gold, supra note 120 (concluding wildfire liabilities pushed
PG&E into bankruptcy).
239. Id. (detailing PG&E’s bankruptcy); see also Kopan, supra note 58 (stating
California’s request for wildfire relief rejected).
240. See Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Camp Fire Victims Have Been Through
“Hell.”  As Last Shelter Closes, Where Will They Go?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 30, 2019,
3:30 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/homeless/article225194350.html
(detailing harrowing experiences of Camp Fire victims and continuing struggles to
find housing).
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their ability to heal.241  It will likely take at least a decade before
they can look at their homes and think, “this is paradise.”242
Rizzlyn Terri M. Melo*
241. For a discussion of hardships victims face following the wildfires, see
supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
242. See Wildfire Victims Thrust into Northern California Housing Shortage, supra
note 53 (predicting years will pass before destroyed towns are rebuilt).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Villanova Charles Widger School of Law, B.S.,
Business Administration, Economics Minor, 2017, Montclair State University. I
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